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Abstract Copies to 
In systems which involve sequential control , 
standby safety systems, and safety shut down pro-
cedures, the sequence of act ions i s important in 
describing normal operation. Event sequence i s 
a l so important i n describing fa i lures in such 
systems in many cases . Several examples can be 
g iven. 
Cause-consequence analys i s techniques are e s -
p e c i a l l y useful for studying such systems, f i r s t l y 
because they offer a systematic way of building 
a mathematical model of the fa i lure process; and 
secondly, because "sequence" i s treated natura l ! 
by the method. A third advantage i s that man* -'ifl-
ferent consequences (TOP events) can be treai 
together , using the same a n a l y s i s . 
Cause-consequence analys i s can be formalised, to 
provide a (semi) automatic method of fa i lure mod« 
and e f f e c t s ana lys i s . The "plant" i s represented 
by a block diagram, with arcs representing caus-
at iona l l i n k s , and the blocks being described by 
arithmetic or l o g i c a l transfer funct ions . A "conn 
dl t lon" i s a predicate which r e s t r i c t s the poss-
i b l e s t a t e s of a system (usually by r e s t r i c t i n g 
the range of values of a s ing le system variable) , 
An "event description" i s a pair of condit ions , 
one of which i s true before the event t ime, the 
other true a f t er the event t ime. Event sequences 
can be traced through the block diagram of the 
system, using techniques developed for autopatic 
theorem proving to deduce the next event at each 
block. 
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SEQUENTIAL EFFECTS IN FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The kind of effects Important in failure mode analysis can 
best be illustrated by example. The following is a simplified 
"adaptation" of an incident which occurred In a nuclear power 
plant. 
First an operator control error occurred leading to a high 
water level in a steam generator. The reactor was operating at 
20* of full power, with the turbine operating at 10JI of full 
power, the remaining steam being dumped directly to the condenser 
via the turbine by-pass valve. The high water level activated pro-
tection circuits which Initiated a turbine trip, and the turbine 
trip in turn caused a reactor trip. Steam temperature dropped, and 
protection circuits, correctly, applied a signal which closed the 
steam dump valve. 
The steam header pressure controller remained set on "AUTO" 
during the following period, and integrated the error between 
shut down steam pressure and pressure set point. Later, the steam 
temperature rose, and the protection circuits again permitted steam 
dump. The steam dump valve opened, and since the pressure control-
ler had integrated error over a long period, the valve opened fully. 
Steam flow rose very rapidly, and activated many of the reset safety 
systems. 
While no threat to safety was involved i;i this Incident, it 
shows the kind of situation in which sequence and time are Import-
ant. 
The fact that the pressure controller was not transferred from 
AUTO to MANUAL would often not matter very much. But In this 
case, a long delay in execution of an (unusual) manual operation, 
plus the long delay in temperature rise, combined to nak« an Inci-
dent worse than expected. 
The plant diagram is shown in fig. I, 
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CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAMS 
Cause consequence diagrams provide a method for describing 
the failure characteristics of a plant (D.S. Nielsen 1970, D.S. 
Nielsen el al. 1971)• Compared with the fault tree technique used 
alone they have two advantages. 
1) There Is a systematic technique for constructing the 
diagrams, given Just a block diagram or wiring diagram 
of the plant. 
2) Sequence is shown explicitly. This makes the diagrams 
especially useful In studying start up, shut down, and 
sequential control problems. 
The construction of cause consequence diagrams can be for-
malised (Taylor 1973)• The advantages of formallsatlon are both 
theoretical - the meaning of the diagrams can be better defined -
and practical - It becomes possible to construct the diagrams by 
computer and build probability models directly from the diagrams. 
Events and conditions. 
The first step In formalising failure mode analysis. Is to 
describe mathematically the idea of one event causing another. 
And the first step in this process is to formalise the idea of 
a "condition". 
The idea of a "condition" Is "a description of a situation 
or state (of a process plant)". The kind of thing one wants to 
express is "component x is working" or "component y baa not yet 
been repaired". 
Definition: 
A condition is a predicate (truth function) describing the 
values of (plant) variables which may be true at several consecu-
tive Instants of time. 
(This definition nay appear fairly restrictive and It is 
worthwhile checking to see If It covers the kind of idea« we want 
to express. Expressions such as "steam pressure is lees than rup-
tur* pressure" fall naturally within the definition. An » a n | » ) W 
such as "pump is working" o an be express«* ,tf t—"~"— " " 
state" as a itat* variable. W« might also was* 
thlnp as "condensate tank ha* been filling fse> 
utes* and this (gain can be expressed sa I **« 
able. However "condensate tank has been.'" 
utes" lie« outside the AeflffUHtwy »»»**; 
such a statement seems to be mer« "— 
with "events".) 
Definition: 
An "event description" Is a pair of conditions, one of 
which Is "true"during an Interval Immediately before the "event 
time", the other being true during an Interval Immediately after 
the event time. The two conditions should not be consistent with 
each other. (Otherwise no change has taken place). 
A "specific event description" could then be defined as an 
event description, coupled with the time at which the event takes 
place e.g. "at 12 o'clock, the steam pressure rises above 10 at-
mospheres". (Formally, this should be interpreted as for an in-
terval Immediately before 12 o'clock steam pressure Is less than 
10 atmospheres, and for an Interval Immediately after 12 o'clock, 
steam pressure Is greater than 10 atmospheres). 
Constructing cause consequence diagrams 
Starting with an Initial (specific) event, such as failure 
of a relay or the pressing of a start button, the sequence of 
events san be traced through a block diagram of a plant. The block 
diagram shows the physical components of the plant and has lines 
representing Interactions between the components. 
Initial event at t,: 
P*Q 
output event at t,: R*s 
output event at t,s T-Hl 
component 1 
component 2 
new state Q> 
> now state 3' 
Pig. 2 Event chain tracing. 
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Each interconnection line in the block diagraa is associated 
with a particular plant variable and the direction of cause and 
effect is shown for each of the lines. The behaviour of each com-
ponent is described by means of equations or transfer functions. 
Given the description of an initial event In one component, 
the effect of this event on the next component In the causal chain 
can be obtained by a process of deduction. The result will be a 
description of the state change In the second component, and a 
description of the event occurring at the output of the second 
component (see fig. 2). When this is performed by computer, tech-
niques of deduction similar to those used In automatic theorem 
proving can be used. 
The true situation is In fact more complex than this, because 
In practice 
1) a component may have several outputs, 
2) a component nay have several Inputs, 
3) the output event will generally depend on component 
state, and hence on earlier events, 
*) a given input event may result in several alternative 
output events, which event occurs being selected completely 
at random. Human errors arc often described In this way. 
5) the input event may establish a "process", that Is, a 
gradual change which may only later lead to an event 
Te.g. the opening of a valve leads to filling of a ink, 
which may later lead to overflow). 
All of these effects must be built into an algorithm for 
tracing event sequences. Several alternative algorithms are poss-
ible. 
Event tracing can proceed a* long as there are no "Immediate" 
or "analogue" feedback loops In the plant block diagraa. If suan 
a situation exists, the components Involved must be separated out 
and treated collectively as a single component. The effects of an 
event on such an "analogue network" may In soma easts be deduced 
analytically. But In moat coses, deduction of too "nest swent" for 
sueb a network requires analogue or numeric simulation teehniaass. 
Processes 
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In some cases, and especially those Involving multiple fail-
ures, the next event In a chain will depend on conditions estab-
lished by earlier events. The cause consequence diagram must ex-
press this dependency, and suitable symbols are shown in Fig. 7. 
Conditions established by an event may endure for the whole 
period covered by an analysis and dependency on this kind of con-
dition is relatively easy to express. In other cases, a condition 
may be established temporarily as a result of one event, and be 
terminated as a result of another event. Repair is an example of 
this type of phenomenon. The event "start of repair" starts the 
repair process, and "completion of repair" terminates the repair 
process. 
In such cases as these, special symbols are used to express 
the concept of a process, as shown in Fig. 9. A process may be 
defined as a condition which describes continuous change in state 
of some part of a system. 
In some cases a process will terminate by its own completion. 
In other cases, a process will be terminated as a result of other 
extraneous events. 
Formal versus manual analysis 
The techniques described in this paper are formal, and can 
therefore be applied directly by computer. In practice such direct 
application is undesirable. The amount of work involved would be 
very large because the formal analysis proceeds by considering 
every possible initial failure event, and the analysis results 
would be confusing. 
The manual techniques described by D.S. Nielsen (197't) make 
use of heuristic rules to reduce the amount of work involved in 
analysis and to make the results comprehensible. Some of these 
"heuristic" rules are sufficiently powerful that they preserve 
the completeness of the formal analysis, e.g. the concept of a 
"critical event" Is applicable to all failure sequences. Other 
heuristic rules described by D.S. Nielsen are presented in an 
earlier report (Taylor 1973). 
The formal technique of consequence analysis is very similar 
to some of the steps used by an engineer in failure mode analysis. 
It 13 envisaged that automatic failure mode analysis will be used 
by an engineer on an interactive basis, to help extend the com-
pleteness and thoroughness og his analyses. 
CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM SYMBOLS 
The choice of symbols for cause consequence diagrams is an 
Important practical consideration. At the same time, choice of 
symbols illustrates the type of phenomena which one meets in 
cause-consequence analysis. 
The primary symbols used in cause consequence diagrams are 
event and condition boxes and decision boxes. Fig. 3 gives an 
example of the use of the basic symbols. 
An important point in developing the set of symbols as shown 
here is that different kinds of probability dependency are dis-
tinguished by using different symbols. As a result there is an 
isomorphism between the structure of the cause consequence dia-
grams, and the event probability density functions (see e.g. 
Taylor 1971). 
MIN run 
rum/u. evtrrr 
pectstmn a 0ji 
tv&rr orscMtrrvcrt 
Mm we« 
THrMOiM-
ftowt 
(MM V*TT«\ TMNK F4/M.J / 
\ 
CMfPtmrt *ø* 
HE- xmtmr 
Fig. 3 BMl« evaftola in 
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It is useful to be able to combine conditions, and the nor-
mal fault tree symbols, and gates, or gates, and negation Indi-
cators are used for this purpose. It is also useful to be able 
to introduce a condition directly into a sequence of events as 
in Fig. l|. 
Rum FULLS 
oecis/on SOK 
TANK WIU. I N. | -
ItOT HOC.P | >k I 
„ v U J 
'-ru-' 
TUN« 
ovetaovs 
t,*oun» 
•CCCNCt 
wcr 
COUPITION TREE 
Pig. 4 Condition trooo and condition D O M I . i 
i 
I 
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"Or" gates can be used in a similar fashion, to shorten dia-
grams in which several event sequences have a similar result (Fig. 
5). 
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••T«ral output Unas to otbar aoaftOMat*, or teaoaas* N M I l l t l « 
put events result at different tlao*. Vila l i atom i* H g . * . 
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BLOCK DIAGRAM CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM 
B.C 
Component with immediate and .Hawed confluence« 
Fig .6 Barking h Event Stqutnct« 
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Ul'.h the possibility; that two sequences of events develop 
"simultaneously", the situation arises in which one event se-
quence can give rise to conditions In which another event se-
quence Is u'.able to develop. Situations in which this kind of 
effect is f.ignlfleant cccur especially where there is a variable 
or random delay involved. The symbols for expressing this situ-
ation are Illustrated in Pig. 7-
Ir some cases, a single event may lead directly to one of 
several alternative immediate events. This is often the situ-
ation with human actions (Fig. 8). 
- I I -
TArfK 
OVCHPIOUS 
P ( t f i - t ) « f i t ) 
rxosqeiutrtc OCLAV 
onntfmu 
purtp is 1 
IJ-TOPPEDJ 
fliirnu i 
2£-
EXPLOiien K> 
J EXPLOSION | 
IcecvAcg I 
CO " ~ 
IOPC«ATD* STOPS PW1P 
DCLtYCP EVtHTS 
Fig.7 Events which inhibit other events 
- 1 2 -
svft&oi. KEPnesef/Ts 
nrrtnrr TO 
cxrwcws* 
t f f l l («HS 
ATTEMPT TO 
CKTjWflMSe 
»TIT« PO*«l 
F l t t f*»lO*lOH 
Fig 8. Alfcrrative immediate event a 
Processes can be represented by a coabinatlon of the ayattole 
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Tlme conventions 
A convention has been adopted for narking the times of events. 
An Initial event time t. Is ascribed to the first sequence In-
itiating event studied. Deterministic delays then lead to time 
Indications t0 • 1, t 0 • 55, etc. Delays which are not determin-
istic require that a new time base variable is introduced e.g. t \ , 
and the fact that t^ is greater than the previous time Indication 
In the event sequence. Is recorded e.g. t^a-tj, + 10. When Indepen-
dent events occur (such as new initiating event, or randomly de-
layed events in two parallel event paths) a new time base variable 
Is introduced, but in this case, its magnitude relative to other 
time base variables may not necessarily be determined. 
Fault tree equivalents of cause consequence diagrams 
it is possible to translate descriptions from cause conse-
quence diagram notation to fault tree notation. The interpretation 
of the events is somewhat different however. The "event boxes" of 
fault trees correspond to "the condition that an event has happened" 
In the cause/consequence notation. The notation 
A Is introduced to represent the condition 
"A has occurred". 
Fig. 10 shows some of the simple fault tree/cause consequence 
diagram equivalents. Combinations of conditions using and, or, and 
not gates are identlal for cause consequence diagrams and for fault 
trees. 
Sequences of events can be represented In fault trass using 
a similar technique to that used in cause consequence diagrams, 
of simply using a sequence of bcxes, connected by linss as In fig. 
11a. An alternative notation Is shown in fig. lib. The usefulness 
of this alternative notation is Illustrated by the example* "event 
D occurs If and only If event B occurs between events A and D". 
The cases where one event directly gives ris« to a seoond 
event also require new symbols, as In fig. 12 ana 13. 
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ALGORITIIMS FOR CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAORAK CONSTRUCTION 
There are s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e a l g o r i t h m s fo r deve lop ing cause 
consequence diagrams, s t a r t i n g from a b lock diagram of a p l a n t , 
with causa l d i r e c t i o n s marked, and an i n i t i a l s e t of p o s s i b l e 
p l a n t 3 t a t e s . 
The f i r s t a lgor i thm given he re t r a c e s the. consequences 
(events ) a r i s i n g from a s i n g l e I n i t i a l ( spontaneous) e v e n t , i n 
time sequence . By t r a c i n g even t s In t ime sequence , problems of 
dec id ing whether a p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n ho lds when deve lop ing 
the next even t , a re reduced. The a lgo r i t hm works on the t r e e of 
events which I t I s known can occur , and o u t p u t t i n g new a d d i t i o n s 
t o t h i s t r e e d i r e c t l y . 
By d i r e c t consequences of an even t i s meant the s e t of e v e n t s 
which can occur a t the output of a p l a n t component, when the even t 
i s appl ied a t the inpu*, of a component. The " d i r e c t consequence" 
events are grouped n a t u r a l l y i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e sequences , depending 
on the p o s s i b l e i n t e r n a l s t a t e s and p o s s i b l e i n p u t s i g n a l s on 
o the r input l i n e s t o the component. 
At each s t age In adding a new even t t o t h e t r e e , the d e s c r i p -
t i o n and f i r s t even t of each a l t e r n a t i v e d i r e c t consequence s e -
quence i s eva lua ted and s e t on an " a l t e r n a t i v e sequence l i s t " . One 
such a l t e r n a t i v e sequence i s s e l e c t e d , and i s s e t on an " u n d e v e l -
oped sequence l i s t " . The f i r s t event of t h e sequence i s then s e t 
on a " fu ture events l i s t " . The e a r l i e s t even t on t h i s f u t u r e e v e n t s 
l i s t i s then s e l e c t e d for f u r t h e r development . In t h i s way, two 
mutually c o n s i s t e n t event sequences i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of a b lock 
diagram can be developed c o n c u r r e n t l y . 
The a lgor i thm i n f i g . I t fol lows t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s . The a l -
gorithm has been to some e x t e n t s i m p l i f i e d . Por some components, 
( fo r example t i m e r / c o u n t e r s ) i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r an i n p u t even t 
t o t r i g g e r an i n f i n i t e sequence of ou tpu t e v e n t s . In t h i s e a s e , 
the a lgor i thm w i l l not t e r m i n a t e . 
One s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem i s t o s t o r e a r e c o r d of each 
sequence under development, and as each even t i s added t o a s e -
quence, to check for a r e p e t i t i o n of e v e n t s and c o n d i t i o n s . When 
the a lgor i thm i s performed manual ly , t h i s i s unneces sa ry . The 
ana ly s t can c o n t r o l the development of i n f i n i t e sequences us ing 
induc t ive r e a s o n i n g . When the a lgo r i thm i s performed by computer 
i t may a l s o be use fu l t o a l low human mon i to r ing of even t sequences , 
s ince the automat ic sequence matching p r o c e s s reduces the e f f e c -
t i venes s of the a lgor i thm c o n s i d e r a b l y . 
When random delay events occur , the a l g o r i t h m develops d i f -
fe ren t sequences fo r each p o s s i b l e t im ing of t h e random event 
r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r e v e n t s . This i s necessary because the for« the 
sequences take may be a l t e r e d by the d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i v e t iming* . 
Start : with thi flets of a l ternat ive i n i t i a l coaponent s t a t e s speci f ied 
Set current event * i n i t i a l event 
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lecord a l t ernat ive even* sequence inforaatioa ( f irat 
event of eaeh ssqneace. currant ayatea s t s t e , input event! 
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I 
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However, in the case where relative timing of a randomly delayed 
event is irrelevant, the resulting alternative sequences should 
not appear on the resulting cause consequence diagram. Again, 
either automatic output editing, involving matching of sequences, 
can be used; or manual control of the cause consequence analysis 
process may be preferred. 
The algorithm for single failure (single initial event) 
consequence analysis can be applied In multiple failure analysis 
using an iterative process. The method of use depends on which 
type of multiple failures is involved. 
A latent failure is one for which there are no immediate 
harmful consequences, but which alters the state of the system, 
so that some later event triggers a harmful consequence. Host 
multiple failure occurrences are of this kind. An Immediate fail-
ure is one which leads directly to harmful consequences, even In 
the absence of later failures. To use the algorithm of Fig. 14 
for this kind of situation, each type of failure within the system 
is analysed individually. The resulting system and states are re-
corded, and then used as possible initial states in double failure 
analyses (one immediate and one latent failure). The process can 
be iterated, to account for situations In which several latent 
failures are present. 
In practical situations, failure frequencies are usually so 
low that it is unnecessary to analyse the consequences of a fail-
ure which occurs while another failure sequence is in progress. 
However, common mode failure mechanisms often involve several 
immediate failures, and this kind of analysis becomes important. 
In this case, multiple failures can be represented by a "failure 
event process", in which the initial Input failure event is fol-
lowed by further failure events, separated by random delays. 
Fault tree algorithm 
In an earlier paper, an algorithm was given for converting 
cause consequence diagrams to fault trees. (Taylor 1974). This 
algorithm is repeated In Fig. 15, and is extended to Include events 
with alternative outcomes, and time delay. The object In editing 
cause consequence diagrams In this way is to remove Information 
which is interesting from a failure mode analysis point of view, 
but is unnecessary for probability calculation. The resulting 
fault trees contain "boxes" representing conditions, reliabilities, 
and events• 
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Flg. 15 Algorithm for editing cause consequence diagrams to 
form fault trees 
1) The algorithm of Fig. 14 produces a consequence tree for 
each In i t ia l event. The event nodes at the ends of branches 
of this tree are result nodes. One tree nay have several 
result nodes which are identical with respect to event 
description, and different trees may contain result nodes 
which are identical In this respect. 
2) Select the result (TOP event) of interest . Hark a l l event 
paths leading to this set of result nodes, and remove a l l 
other event paths from the consequence trees. If two or more 
paths have a common subpath, which forks via a condition box, 
an event decision box, or an alternative event outcome node, 
Join the paths immediately before the result node using an 
"exclusive or" symbol. Fig. 15A. 
3) Join a l l of paths established in step 2 and unjoined paths, 
immediately before the result nodes, using an "or" symbol. 
See Fig. 15B. 
4) Replace a l l time delay symbols by time delay "causal and" 
symbols, as in Fig. 11. 
5) Replace condition boxes and event decision boxes by "and" 
gates with specified event sequence, as In Pig. l o . If both 
outcomes of a decision box or condition box l i e within the 
marked consequence paths, duplicate the paths leading to 
the box, and use two sequential and gates, one with the posi-
tive condition marked, the other with the negative condition, 
each leading to i t s appropriate consequent event sequence. 
6) Replace alternative event outcome symbols by probability 
"causal and" symbols as in Fig. 13. If both alternative out-
comes l i e within the remaining event paths, replace the 
alternative event outcome symbol by two probability "causal 
and" symbols, and duplicate the event path* leading to toe 
alternative event outcome symbol. 
7) Replace event sequence forks (parallel event sequence symbol) 
by duplicating the sequence preceding the fork, add removing 
the fork symbol. Fig, 15«• 
S) Remove a l l event boxes In the consequence tree«,-' •»•art - f W 
In i t ia l event boxes. r 
9) Remove a l l condition and event bom« will ill i p i j J I e t C i J I 
normal operation, and which have a probaMI&9 ;fft*W*llltt** 
during the period of Interest , appvoaemaf *tP#J $• ..'..* *'«•• 
é 
ru 
<i> Fie 15 c 
<§> <2> <a> 
F.-j 15 b 
ip np 
• * 
* < * t *e r 
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CAUSE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS GENERATES MINIMAL CUT SETS 
It has been pointed out by D.S. Nielsen (1974) that cause 
consequence diagrams produced by hand Involve only minimal cut 
sets (c.f. Fussel 1973). While this Is not strictly true of the 
construction algorithm of Fig. 14, and the editing algorithm of 
Fig. 15, the exceptions are unlikely to occur In practice. It Is 
possible to extend the algorithm of Fig. 14 so that the cause 
consequence diagram, when edited by the algorithm of Fig. 15, con-
tains only minimal cut sets. This is useful, because the prob-
ability computation rules for the resulting fault trees are much 
simplified. 
A proof that the extended algorithm generates minimal cut sets 
is presented here, and the extensions to the algorithm are pre-
sented simultaneously. In this way, it Is easier to see why the 
extensions are required. 
Definition: 
In cause consequence diagram terms, a minimal cut set Is 
defined as a set of Initial events and primary conditions, which 
together can lead to a particular unwanted result, and which does 
not contain a subset of initial events and primary conditions 
which can lead to the sane unwanted event. 
Theorem: 
The extended cause consequence diagram construction algorithm 
generates minimal sut s e t s . 
1) To simplify the proof, the term "partial cut set" It-llttre* 
dueed, to represent the set of i n i t i a l events and primary con-
ditions which must hold in order to reach a particular point 
within an event sequence. 
2) Assume the converse of the theorem. Then there are two <mt 
sets for a given result (TOP) event, on« of which Is a subset of 
the other. 
3) Since each partial cut set arising In a 
diagram must contain an In i t ia l event —•'— 
occurs In just one consequence event 
cut set must occur ii 
ami partial eut aet . 
4) It 1* assumed that condition 
boxes to an event sequence path, i 
normal form, wltb only plni 
in so far as they oo«wr, eye 
conditions arising i i l + v t l r 
i t, and sash W t l al event 
i J -«s^r;fff> f j g m | i l g A M l » n t 
e n the same »etMixø^-'-imi&^'t^l&WFWmi--
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Thls assumption is satisfied naturally by the event deduction 
algorithms which could reasonably be used in cause consequence 
analysis 
5) In order for two separate partial cut sets of any form to 
arise within an event consequence tree, there must be an "or" 
symbol within the tree. Such an "or" symbol can arise In either 
of two ways -
a) because of an "or" symbol within a condition tree. 
b) because of forking (due to parallel event sequences, 
or alternative event sequences) in the event tree, where 
both branches of the fork lead to the same event. 
6) Case a 
Given an event sequence with a decision box as i t s last 
node; the pa r t i a l cut set prior to the decision box can be rap-
resented as 
Bj v Bj v . . . . vBn 
Where Bj is a partial cut , that is, a conjunction of con-
ditions and events. The condition associated with the decision 
box can, according to 4), be represented as 
Ci v C2 v .... Cm 
where Cj i s a pa r t i a l cut . The partial cut set immediately 
following the decision box wil l be 
V BiJCJ 
i » 1 . . . n 
J = 1 . . . m 
This new partial cut set will contain non minimal cuts only 
if there are i>, q, r, s such that 
BpXCq * BrCCs 
Assuming that each Bi is a minimal cut (Induction hypothesis.) 
Bp v* Br 
And from assumption 4 
Cq <S Cs 
Therefore we must have 
Bp - Br * Cs 
or Cq - Cs * Br 
7) The situation described in step 6 can oeeur In principle, in 
the development of a cause consequence diagram. A simple example 
1 
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A 
1 
t 
« l a g 
partial cut set 
This corresponds to the case in which a condition for further 
development of an event sequence is automatically fulfilled, as a 
condition of its earlier development. By maintaining a record of 
the partial cut set of each event sequence, such conditions can be 
removed, to give 
I 
A 
1 1 
. T 
» 
. * 
ft? 
8) More complex examples than that of 7) can occur e.g. 
I 
T » M U I M 
nam minimal cot sots 
I 
In this oase, however, conditions may not simply be deleted, 
since the result would be incorrect. 
This situation can be detected, if a record of partial 
cut sets is kept for each event sequence, and a check is made 
for cases where Bp£Cq * Br/Cs. The problem can then be removed, 
by duplicating the previous event sequence, once for each prob-
lematic cut set, and then deleting redundant conditions, e.g. 
• i _ _ 
T T 
N [ V . •TUT 
n~U?i—rr~UP 
AiliS Alii l 
ttft v "6*B U-
SlCIPr iiiiP 
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3) By induction, If the construction algorithm Is extended in 
the way described in steps 7 and 8, non minimal partial cut sets 
cannot be introduced via a condition tree. 
lo) case b 
Forking In the consequence event tree can be introduced via 
c) condition box or alternative event outcome nodes. 
d) parallel event sequences. 
11) case c 
A condition box fork, or alternative event outcome fork, 
require that an additional condition Is added to the cut sets. 
A positive condition is added to the cut sets on one side of the 
fork, a negative condition to the cut sets on the other side of 
the fork. Therefore, when the two branches are later Joined via 
an'or'gate, cut sets from one branch cannot be subsets of cut sets 
from the other branch. 
12) case d 
This case Involves two parallel event paths within the block 
diagram, both of which lead to the same component, and cause the 
sane result event. Then either the time delay* are Identical for 
the two paths (case e); or a condition established as a result of 
an event on one path, la later negated (aa a result of a delayed 
event within the component, or via an event sequence along a third 
path) and then still later Is reestablished by the second event 
sequence (case t ) . 
13) In the case e, a trivial extension to the cause consequence 
diagram construction algorithm can ensure that two events never 
occur simultaneously (by adding a small Increment to one event 
time so that two events can never oeeur precisely simultaneously•> 
1*) case f 
This case, where an event happens. Its effeat la removed 
by a later event, and the event ttiia happens, can be lllw$r**«4 
by the following example. 
-2(1-
cut set = A 
If the required result of fault tree analysis Is to determine 
event probability density functions, then both cut sets should be 
Included In the eventual fault tree. If what Is required is the 
probability that at sone time t, event x has happened (at least 
once), then development of parallel sequences should be stopped at 
the first time at which the desired result event occurs, and pro-
cessing should proceed to other alternative sequences. 
15) Since non minimal cut sets cannot be Introduced Into a cause 
consequence g-aph via condition trees, nor via forking of the event 
sequence paths, and since these are the only ways new cut sets can 
be Introduced, the extended cause consequence diagram algorithm 
produces diagrams Involving Just minimal cut sets. 
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USING THE ALGORITHMS 
Event deduction vs . failure transfer functions 
Fussel (1973) has described a technique for constructing 
fault trees automatically. In th is , he used the concept of f a i l -
ure transfer functions. These are sets of senemas for parts of 
fault trees , associated with particular plant components. The 
partial fault trees describe both the ways in which the Individ-
ual component can f a l l , and also the ways in which the component 
can transmit the effect of a "failure" event at i t s input. 
I t i s clear that such failure transfer functions could be 
extended, to apply to components with delay involved. They already 
take account of event sequence. Therefore a technique using f a i l -
ure transfer functions could be used to replace the event deduc-
tion process, and to eliminate the need for equations for each 
component. On finding an output event for a component, this would 
be matched against the set of Input events for the failure trans-
fer functions of the next component. See Fig. 16. 
This approach has many advantages. The event deduction pro-
cess can In some cases be Inefficient. And the fault tree notation 
used to express failure transfer functions Is readily understood 
by analysts. 
The major advantage of using event deduction Is that of apace 
- time trade off. A comparatively short equation can correspond to 
a large number of transfer function trees . In these eases the equa-
tion/deduction form saves space. Clearly, availabil ity of both 
methods of representation would be best. 
A further advantage of the aquation fern i s that i t i s not 
committed to direction of cause and e f fect . So ft single set of 
equations can be used to describe components such as diract earrant 
motor/generators, In which causation can be in either direction. 
Reversal of consequence analysis 
The cauae consequence analysis 
start by l i s t i n g a l l the possible eoa 
working forwards to evaluate a l l poes i— — . . ._ 
events. This corresponds to • formallaatiOB of n i l * * * Mf» mnWHh 
It i s also possible to operate tbe MelsHaam la 
that starting from a given unwanted reealt 
quenoes leading to that resal* as* fMadM 
lustratsd by r ig . 16, where faseeU T f « P 
trees' are used to describe •ismanmli, 9k» as* 
cause oonsequenee diagram« axffere fra« ajpa ajej 
 procedures so far aassriesel 
moaent Jtttar« •*•**•> at* 
•slble aswaaamsgtaa «f |tM*e 
Us tloa f m»m aw** mOf 
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for constructing fault trees (Fussel 1973) In the kind of output 
produced, and in the fact that timing of events sust be recorded 
and used in the algorithm. The determination of relative timings 
of events becomes a responsibility of the construction algorithm, 
as does the determination of compatibility between the possibly 
mutually exclusive conditions established during an event sequence. 
Forward cause-consequence analysis is able to provide a de-
scription of consequences which is complete with respect to a 
particular set of component failure models, and up to a certain 
degree of multiple (immediate or latent) failure. For example, all 
the consequences of a single immediate failures occurring simul-
taneously with three latent failures might be evaluated. 
It would be desirable to retain this kind of completeness 
for the reverse analysis, so that all unwanted consequences were 
studied, while gaining the advantage of ignoring inrelevant con-
sequences. Rasmussen has suggested (1973) a useful heuristic for 
limiting the number of end consequences to be considered, by as-
suming that an unwanted result must arise from a release of energy, 
and that this requires either a large energy flow or large energy 
accumulation, In conjurction with a breach of the energy contain-
ment boundary. In this way, attention can at first be limited to 
events occurring in energy constraining components. The principle 
could be extended to components containing occumulations of poison. 
For such incidents as explosion, breach of containment is 
not necessarily a trigger. Powers (197") has described a technique 
for discovering failure potential, by searching for sets of fac-
tors (conditions) which lead to accidents if simultaneously pre-
sent. 
These techniques are relevant for accident analysis. For 
studies of production continuity and availability, one should 
presumably start from the event "cease production of end product" 
and work backwards. 
It has been observed in practice that it is relatively dif-
ficult for an analyst to "work backwards", in a direction oppoalt« 
to that of causality. Instead there is a tendency to guess an 
earlier event which could lead to a given end result, and then 
confirm the guess by forward analysis. The programmed algorithms 
may be able to support manual analysis In this respect. 
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USE OF CAUSE CONSEQUENCE TECHNIQUES - MULTIPLE LATENT FAILURES 
Cause consequence analysis Is a tool Intended primarily for 
the study of problems In which sequence and timing are Important. 
Nuclear reactor shut down systems are just of this type. 
Experience shows that when a failure event of some import-
ance occurs ("abnormal occurrences", as reported In (USAEC 197*1) 
for example), It often involves a single initiating failure, plus 
several further failures. In an earlier study (Taylor 1971) of 
abnormal occurrences reported for two nuclear reactors during one 
year, the frequency of six fold failures is not significantly dif-
ferent from the frequency of three fold failures. While this result 
Is derived from a fairly small sample, the results are also sup-
ported by wider less carefully controlled studies. The high fre-
quency of incidents involving several failures is initially very 
surprising, but becomes less so when It is realized that several 
simultaneous failures are not Involved. What is involved In the 
simultaneous activatioi of several latent failures. However, the 
results depart so much from the usual model derived via fault tree 
analysis, as to require explanation. 
A histogram of the distribution of multiple failure occur-
rences is shown in Pig. 17. For the purpose of deriving this 
histogram, incidents were analysed to discover the original cause 
of failure conditions until a category from the group design, fab-
rication, Installation, operation, or random mechanical/electrical 
error could be assigned. Common mode failures (those in which an 
unanticipated causal link excists between components, such as 
envlronnental effects on components of similar type) were regarded 
as tingle failures for the purposes of the study. 
The surprising fact about the form of Pig. 17, Is not the 
high frequency of multiple failures - the frequency of such fail-
ures Is not regarded by the author as especially high In any case. 
What Is surprising is that for multiple failures from two to ten 
fold, the frequencies are roughly the same. 
Three effects appear to the author to be relevant in explain-
ing these facts. 
1) Latent failures are involved. On the basis of the data there 
is a relatively high probability that shut down systems contain 
several latent errors. This Is clear, on the basis of th« data, but 
is In sharp contrast to the fact that test frequencies are chosen 
so that the probability of multiple failures should be low. Sow 
further contributing explanation must be sought. 
2) Some initial events move the system into a new or unusual 
operating state, which differ from those assumed during design 
and the planning of tests. In this new state, several latent fall-
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ures are activated. This second explanation, taken together with 
the first, seems satisfactory. For each "unusual state" there is 
a single initiating failure which triggers it. The frequency of 
suci) failures should be somewhat less than one third the frequency 
of failures which in themselves lead to significant consequences. 
The number of latent failures activated in such unusual states is 
the.i between one and eight (roughly), with the frequency of the 
different numbers failures more or less evenly distributed. 
3) The consequences of multiple failures are often more sig-
nificant. Therefore in gatherering data on "abnormal occurrences" 
the number of multiple failure incidents would be unusually high. 
This is, in fact, the case, and means that a simple failure 
which would not merit the "abnormal occurrence" classification, in 
itself, can under certain circumstances lead to very significant 
chains of consequences. This effect m.<sds to be taken into account, 
when estimating the frequency of trigger events, as described under 
point 1. 
It is clear that in arriving at quantitative explanations 
of such facts, the concept of latent and immediate failures are 
Important. Sequence is also significant, in that the stage at 
fhlch a latent failure Is activated, is often important. For such 
systems, cause consequence analysis appears to us to be an import-
ant tool. 
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